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Systemic Risk Spillovers in the European Banking and Sovereign Network 1 Introduction
A clear lesson from the global financial crisis has been the propensity for companyspecific risk to spill over to other firms. These spill-overs arise from contractual linkages in conjunction with heightened counterparty risk, but also from price effects generated by for instance fire sales. The result of these spill-overs has been the freezing of interbank markets observed at the height of the global financial crisis in October 2008. The market freeze was followed by a much longer period of interbank market fragmentation during European sovereign debt crisis, during which banks in core European countries were no longer willing to finance banks in the periphery.
Another key feature, particularly salient during the European sovereign debt crisis, has been the interplay between fiscally strained sovereign banks and stressed banks. An impaired banking sector has limited ability to support economic activity, which in turn further strains public finances, eventually putting in question the ability of the sovereign to clean up the banking system. The ECB (2011, 2012) identifies this adverse feedback loop as the key risk to financial stability in the euro area. A better ability to understand and monitor the fragmentation of European financial markets as well as the interdependence between banks and sovereigns is thus of utmost importance for central banks and policy makers.
In this paper, we address these challenges and contribute to the literature in three major aspects. First, we further develop an econometric model which allows handling the high dimensionality in tail risk networks while producing sufficiently precise and robust quantities given the available data in rolling windows. Second, we employ a unique data set consisting of equity prices, CDS prices and quarterly balance sheet data of large European banks as well as CDS and government bond prices of corresponding sovereigns. This database allows us to cover a major fraction of the European banking and sovereign system. Third, we provide novel insights into time-varying tail risk dependencies and spillovers between European banks and sovereigns, particularly covering the 2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. We show how network connectedness, fragmentation and interactions between European financial institutions and sovereigns change over this time period and how the state of the financial system is reflected in the topology of the underlying network.
Our empirical methodology builds on the framework proposed by (Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle 2014a) (henceforth HSS2014) and (Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle 2014b) . The underlying idea is to quantify the systemic impact of an individual company by the marginal effect of a firm's time-varying Value at Risk (VaR) on the VaR of the entire system. To statistically identify the relevant tail risk drivers of a specific company out of a high-dimensional set of potential characteristics (including the tail risk of other companies), HSS2014 propose to use a statistical regularization and shrinkage method. The selection of individual-specific tail risk drivers gives a rise to a risk network, determining to what extent the VaR of a company is driven by the tail risk of other companies. This information is then explicitly utilized in a second step, where the marginal systemic relevance of an individual firm is quantified using a quantile regression of the system VaR on the VaR of the respective company while controlling for the firm-specific risk drivers and additional economic state variables. The explicit quantification and utilization of network dependencies distinguishes HSS2014 from alternative methods for measuring and predicting systemic risk, see, e.g., Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon, and Richardson (2010) , Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) , and Brownlees and Engle (2012) .
In this paper, we further develop the methodology introduced by HSS2014 in two directions. First, we adapt the approach to make it feasible to use in situations, where the density of the network is high and the underlying sample period is relatively short. In such a situation, individual companies may face tail risk spillovers from many others, making it necessary to account for large sets of individual-specific tail risk drivers when estimating companies' marginal systemic risk contribution in a quantile regression of the system VaR. The requirement of controlling for a large number of different risk factors, while having a comparably short estimation window, makes standard estimates inherently inefficient and unstable and -in the extreme case -even infeasible. We therefore propose an adaptive version of the standard shrinkage technique for determining the relevant risk drivers not only among other banks but also among sovereigns. The use of relatively short estimation windows is driven by the need of accounting for time-variations in companies' systemic riskiness and underlying network connections. Accounting for time variations via rolling window estimations, however, is crucial when the framework is used for surveillance and monitoring of the system building the basis for macroprudential regulation. To overcome this empirical difficulty and to address the tradeoff between estimation robustness on the one hand and capturing time-variability of the underlying relationships on the other hand, we propose combining the two-step quantile framework with a panel fixed effects approach. While controlling for company-specific fixed effects, we keep the model sufficiently parsimonious by imposing group-wise common parameters. We show that this approach is empirically tractable and balances model flexibility and estimation robustness in the given context. Second, when estimating a company's systemic relevance, we explicitly account for the interconnectedness of an institution, measured by its network centrality. We empirically show that the latter is a significant factor of a firm's systemic risk contribution.
Empirically, we contribute to the literature in two major directions. First, focusing on 51 large European banks allows us covering a substantial fraction of the European banking system. Moreover, by analyzing data up to 2013, we are able to study the effects of the global financial crisis, its aftermath and the transition into the European sovereign debt crisis on the fragmentation and integration of the European financial system. Second, bringing together both banks and sovereigns in a network estimated based on CDS returns yields novel insights on the interplay between the banks and the sovereigns. We quantify and visualize time-varying tail dependencies, spillover directions and the density of networks, and show how banking sector fragmentation and sovereign-bank linkages evolved over the European sovereign debt crisis.
Beyond the growing literature on estimation of systemic risk contributions, our paper is also related to the papers investigating the sovereign bank-interlinkages, such as Ejsing and Lemke (2011), Alter and Schüler (2012) , Arnold (2012) , Bruyckere, Gerhardt, Schepens, and Vennet (2013) , Alter and Beyer (2014) , and Correa, Lee, Sapriza, and Suarez (2014) . The key difference to the aforementioned papers, which mainly analyze contagion or spillover effects between sovereign and bank CDS spreads or credit rating downgrades, is the ability of our approach to incorporate both sovereigns and banks into tail risk networks and to track how their interconnectedness evolves over time.
Moreover, methodologically our paper is also related to earlier studies analysing contagion and co-movement in banks' equity prices using extreme value theory, in particular to Gropp, Duca, and Vesala (2009) , who analyse cross-border contagion among European banks in 1994 -2003 and to Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003 and Hartmann, Straetmans, and De Vries (2004) , who focus on cross-country spillovers. Finally, our paper is also closely related to the increasing literature analysing financial networks, contagion and systemic risk, see e.g. Allen and Gale (2000) and Cont, Moussa, and Santos (2013) 1 .
The key findings are as follows: First, we observe that the density of the European financial network increases from 2006 onwards, peaks around the height of the financial crisis and significantly declines thereafter. Second, an interesting feature of the sovereign credit crisis 2011-2013 is a clear decline of banks' connectedness and an increasing market fragmentation reflected by a dominance of domestic (within-country) linkages. Third, the national fragmentation during the sovereign credit crisis is accompanied by increasing dependencies between sovereigns and financial firms, making particularly the CDS tail risk of Italy, Spain and Greece strongly dependent of the financial sector. Fourth, the 1 see Chinazzi and Fagiolo (2013) for a recent review of this literature topology of the European banking and sovereign network clearly changes when moving from the 2008 financial crisis to the current credit risk crisis. We find that the state of the system is well reflected in underlying network statistics which might be used as (rough) indicators for monitoring purposes.
From a methodological point of view, we show the importance of explicitly linking a bank's or sovereign's connectedness (e.g., reflected by its network centrality) to its (timevarying) systemic risk contribution. Moreover, particularly relevant for the European sovereign debt crisis, we stress the relevance of sovereign risk as banks' tail risk driver. Finally, the combination of the two-stage panel framework with a panel fixed effects approach turns out to provide sufficiently robust estimates given data availability and the need of addressing a dense tail risk network.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the estimation methodolgy while Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 presents the results and is divided into three subsections: Subsection 4.1 illustrates the estimated time-varying tail risk networks, Subsection 4.2 describes the sovereign-bank interactions, while Subsection 4.3 presents the systemic risk contributions. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
Methodology
Our empirical methodology in estimating systemic risk contributions works in two steps. The first step is necessary for determining the time-varying topology of the underlying tail risk network of banks and sovereigns. While this contains valuable economic information on its own, it is indispensable for identifying the systemic risk contribution of a bank in a densely interconnected system. The outcome of this step is the estimated conditional VaR of each institution given the underlying network structure and economic state variables. The second step explicitly utilizes information on the identified network to estimate an individual institution's marginal impact on the system VaR.
Time-Varying Bank-Sovereign Networks
We constitute generalized tail risk networks for the European bank-sovereign system by substantially adapting and extending the approach in Hautsch, Schaumburg, and Schienle (2014a) . In particular, we account for potentially time-varying bank sovereign spillovers and explicitly include sovereigns as parts of the generalized European financial network. The main idea is to empirically determine a network link from bank/sovereign j to bank/sovereign i, whenever the tail risk of i is (positively) affected by the distress of j. Denoting the equity or CDS return of bank/sovereign i by X i t , the tail risk of i is reflected by its conditional Value-at-Risk (VaR), V aR i q,t , given a set of i-specific risk drivers R i t , i.e.,
with V aR i q,t denoting the (negative) conditional q-quantile of X i t . 2 The distress of a bank/sovereign is identified by the corresponding return being below its empirical 10% quantile. Accordingly, we define a so-called loss exceedance by N t,j = X j t 1(X j t ≤Q j 0.1 ), whereQ 0.1 is the unconditional 10% sample quantile of X j t . The full set of tail risk drivers of a bank/sovereign i thus consists of loss exceedances of banks/sovereigns other than i, which we denote as vector N i t with elements N t,j for j = i, and additional observable control variables Z i t . These externalities Z i t contain macrofinancial state variables, and, in case of banks, i-specific balance sheet characteristics. Specifying V aR i t as a linear function of the regressors yields
Thus, in theory, it appears straightforward to estimate this model by standard linear quantile regression techniques (see Koenker and Bassett (1978) ). But in practice, this is infeasible. The challenge of this task is that the number of loss exceedances N i t potentially affecting i is large. Including the entire set N i t as regressors in the model would result in highly imprecise and unstable estimates. Moreover, (sequential) tests on the statistical significance of individual variables are virtually infeasible with outcomes hardly interpretable.
We therefore statistically identify the subset of relevant i-specific loss exceedances, denoted by N (i) t , from the full set of potential network influences N i t by a model shrinkage approach. In particular, we use a weighted version of the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator (LASSO) approach for quantile regression as introduced by Belloni and Chernozhukov (2011) . The idea is to run a penalized quantile regression to find the estimateα The coefficient λ i is a penalty parameter, which penalizes regressors which do not sufficiently contribute to the objective function, and thus are not relevant for the model. Due to the penalization, the coefficients of these regressors are shrinked towards zero. Hence, the penalization component helps to identify relevant loss exceedances as those regressors with sufficiently large marginal effects. Correspondingly, a regressor is de-selected if its (adaptive) LASSO estimate in α i 2 is close to zero. The strength of the penalization is therefore governed by λ i with the number of eliminated regressors increasing in λ i . For instance, for λ i = 0, we obtain the standard quantile regression problem according to Koenker and Bassett (1978) . As loss exceedances of banks and sovereigns might be of quite different magnitudes, it is important to allow for regressor-specific penalizations w i k .
Both λ
i and w i k are chosen in a data-driven way, optimizing the score of (3) with remaining constants maximizing the in-sample predictive ability of the resulting post-LASSO quantile specification. The quality of the in-sample fit is evaluated based on the model's backtesting performance. The details of this procedure are presented in the Appendix. Finally, retaining only the regressors, which are not de-selected by the weighted LASSO results into the corresponding 'post-LASSO' VaR specification.
The weighted quantile LASSO approach is performed for each bank and sovereign i. The final set of post-LASSO regressors yields the set of i-specific tail risk drivers. Then, the weighted LASSO-selected i-specific loss exceedances N (i) t constitute directed network impacts to bank i. By moving along all banks in the system, we thus obtain a network graph showing tail dependence relationships among banks conditional on the control variables Z i t . Moreover, to allow for time-variations in network dependencies, we perform this analysis based on rolling windows, where sample windows of 24 months are rolled over at a yearly frequency. In particular, at the beginning of each period indexed by t 0 , we determine relevant risk drivers based on the weighted LASSO approach utilizing information from the previous two years. Thus, networks are year-specific and can vary on an annual basis. Correspondingly, the VaR of firm/sovereign i at time t in year t 0 is determined as
where
is the set of i-specific loss exceedances selected by the LASSO procedure for the period indexed by year t 0 and the coefficients α This approach is performed in Section 4 to estimate (i) tail risk networks of financial companies based on equity returns with sovereigns' bond returns serving as (nonpenalized) state variables and (ii) joint tail risk networks of both banks and sovereigns based on corresponding CDS returns. For more details on the choices of Z where the (time-varying) marginal effect β t 0 is referred to systemic risk beta. Apart from time variations of β t 0 arising from the rolling window estimation, we allow for additional variation within a two-year period (indexed by t 0 ) by modeling β t 0 as a function of firm-specific characteristics B i t and an i-specific local network measure, net i,t 0 t , defined as the logarithm of one plus the out-degree of node i in the network topology.
3 The latter characterizes the firm's connectedness in the corresponding year-t 0 network topology at time t, and thus explicitly links a firm's marginal systemic relevance to its role in the underlying tail risk network. Furthermore, γ i,t 0 is a firm-specific fixed effect, R (i,t 0 ) is a value-weighted index of the VaRs of all banks selected as relevant for bank i in the first step, and Z s contain macro-financial state variables. The inclusion of these i-specific control variables, in particular the individual fixed effect and the aggregated indicator for network spillover influences on beta R (i,t 0 ) , provide a robust way to obtain unbiased estimates of β. To keep the approach computationally tractable, we assume β t 0 being linear in its components within a group g ∈ {1, . . . , G} of similar institutions in a dense network, i.e.,
The grouping of institutions is necessary in order to balance robustness of the obtained beta measure against the variability required for consistent estimation of the effect. Hence, pooling together firms which are found as being similar in terms of their (average) marginal systemic impact and their marginal effects with respect to the variables B i t , allows estimating the parameters in (6) group-wise instead of individual-specific. In practice, we suggest a simple and straightforward data-driven procedure to obtain adequate groups, which we outline below in the empirical section. Thus, groups are objective and yield a stabilizing effect on the obtained systemic risk beta in a dense network.
The full specification is then estimated by a single (pooled) quantile SUR system regression with the inclusion of appropriate group and bank specific dummies. Thus, the coefficients of control variables from the system Z s and from the network R (i,t 0 ) are common across all institutions, while influences of balance sheet characteristics on the timevariation of β can vary across subgroups in estimates of δ This is the measure according to which we assess the overall systemic importance of institutions. It reflects the total realized effect of an increase in a bank i risk level on the risk of the entire system. This impact consists of the direct impact via the idiosyncratic VaR but also of a potential change in the marginal systemic effect via beta. Our rankings in the following are based on realized systemic risk betas.
Data
Our dataset consists of 51 large European banks, which we choose based on the following criteria. First, we select the largest European banks, covering up to 90% of the European banking system's total assets (in 2010), which results in 74 banks. Second, as the empirical analysis requires equity price data, we keep only the publicly traded and listed banks in the sample, which leaves us with 53 listed banks, covering 72.4% of the European banking system's total assets. Third, two further banks (Bankia and Österreichische Volksbanken) are dropped from the sample due to data limitations. The list of 51 banks in the sample is shown in Table 1 . For each institution, we collect quarterly balance sheet data as well as daily equity prices covering the period from 01/07/2006 to 30/06/2013 from Bloomberg. If available, we also collect corresponding data on 5-year senior CDS spreads. Stock prices enter the regressions in the form of returns; CDS prices in first differences.
As V aR i -specific control variables Z i t , we choose a set of bank-specific balance sheet characteristics. These include leverage, measured as total assets over total equity, to capture the fragility of a bank. Loan loss reserves and return on assets represent asset quality, whereas the cost-to-income ratio and the price-to-book ratio measure management quality. The return on equity measures a bank's capacity to generate earnings, while the ratio of net short-term borrowing to total liabilities and the loan-to-deposit ratio capture liquidity risk. The size, measured as total assets, proxies for the bank being too big to fail. We also collect the release date of the balance sheet information and merge it with the stock price data accordingly to use the data in real-time manner.
The dataset also includes macro-financial state variables. We use the Euribor-OIS spread as barometer of distress in money markets covering both liquidity and credit risk. The VDAX index measures implied volatility in the German stock market, proxying for investors' risk appetite. To represent sovereign risk, we also collect data on the sovereigns of the countries where the banks are headquartered. Thus, our sample includes the following sovereigns: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the UK. The data include the yields on 10-year benchmarks bonds, the slope of the yield curve as measured by the yield difference between 10-year and 2-year bonds as well as the 5-year sovereign CDS spreads. The Stoxx Europe 600 Financial Services index is used to represent the financial system in the second stage.
The macro-financial state variables listed above are also used as control variables Z Tables 2 and 3 visually and quantitatively characterize the evolution of tail dependence networks of all financial companies for all six (overlapping) two-year subperiods. Here, the external influences Z i t on the network in (2) contain company-specific characteristics and macroeconomic state variables as described in Section 3. We measure a bank's interconnectedness by its network degree and graphically illustrate it by the size of the nodes in Figures 1 and 2 . In the figures, we label all banks whose degree is above the 75th percentile of the degree distribution in the respective subperiod. The shape of each network is obtained by minimizing the length of all aggregated network connections between all institutions. Correspondingly, the most connected firms are located in the center of the network graph. As Figures 1 and 2 show, the density of the network clearly varies over time indicating that the financial system is moving through different states. This is confirmed by the corresponding network densities reported in Table 2 . 4 The network density increases from 0.07 in the first subperiod to 0.08 at the height of the global financial crisis. In contrast, during the European sovereign debt crisis, the network density decreases to 0.04. The pattern is intuitive as one would expect tail dependence between banks to increase during a financial crisis. Conversely, a stronger role of sovereigns in transmitting shocks should be reflected in sparser tail dependencies between banks. Since sovereign bond returns serve as non-penalized control variables, a stronger impact thereof might be responsible for the decline of network density after 2008. Tail-dependence networks where sovereigns are not used as control variables but as risk drivers (see Section 4.2) confirm the view that the decline of network densities in bank-only networks during the period 2010 to 2013 reflects mainly the increasing role of sovereigns. On the other hand, the increase in network densities from 0.04 to 0.05 between the two last subperiods suggests that the intensity of the sovereign debt crisis has to some extent receded.
The colour of the nodes, which indicates the countries where the banks are headquartered, illustrates the impact of country-specific developments on the network structure. While during the 2006-2008 period, the most interconnected firms originate predominantly from Spain, but also from France, Portugal and Ireland, in the subsequent period also Italian and British banks move to the center of the network. Both network graphs depict pronounced country-specific clusters with strong cross-country links, in particular, among banks in the center of the network. These developments might already indicate upcoming problems in the banking sector of these countries, partly driving the European sovereign debt crisis in 2012/13. While these 'national clusters' disappear in the height of the global financial crisis (reflected by the 2008-2010 subgraph), they become very pronounced in the aftermath.
The sovereign debt crisis in particular is characterized by a strong fragmentation of the financial network with 'domestic' linkages (i.e., linkages between companies within a country) becoming increasingly prominent. This is confirmed by Table 2 , showing that the share of domestic linkages (relative to all linkages) has increased from 0.28 in the 2008-2010 sub-period to 0.52 in the 2010-2012 sub-period. Again, the slight decrease to 0.45 in the latest sub-period might reflect a relaxation of the sovereign debt crisis. This is most obvious for financial institutions in Greece and Cyprus, Italy, Spain and Portugal, and (partly) France. Particularly Greece and Cyprus move towards the fringe of the network. In the 2010-2013 sub-periods, they are totally disconnected from the rest of the network. Also Spanish and Portuguese banks jointly leave the center of the network (2009) (2010) (2011) , with in particular the Portuguese banks becoming increasingly disconnected to the rest of the system. Third, Table 3 provides the shares of domestic links separately for countries, which have been particularly affected by the sovereign debt crisis (in particular, Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain) and all other countries. It turns out that countries affected by the sovereign debt crisis display on average a higher share of domestic linkages. This is most pronounced during the 2009-2011 and the 2010-2012 period, and is consistent with the notion that financial fragmentation has primarily affected banking systems in the European periphery. 
Sovereign-bank interaction
Complementing the analysis above by a corresponding analysis based on CDS data opens up a valuable additional perspective. In particular, CDS prices reflect investors' expectations on default risks, and thus are explicitly connected to extreme market movements. Moreover, utilizing CDS returns allows us constructing and analyzing a network of both financial companies and underlying sovereigns. This complements the analysis above, where information on sovereign risk enters the analysis only via respective bond returns used as economic state variables. According to the ECB and the IMF 5 , the European sovereign debt crisis is characterised by the interplay of fiscally constrained sovereigns and weak banking systems. Exploiting CDS prices enables us to study to what extent this relationship is also reflected in the tail dependence networks.
The network construction differs from the procedure explained in Section 4.1 in the following way: First, instead of equity returns as underlying variables we utilize CDS returns of both banks and sovereigns. Accordingly, bank and sovereign CDS returns are both penalized in the weighted LASSO approach. As illustrated below, this leads to an overall higher level of penalization, which is reflected in higher network densities. Second, when modeling the VaR of a bank, Z i t consists of bank-specific balance sheet characteristics and macro-financial state variables (as described in Section 3). Conversely, in case of a sovereign, we only include macro-financial state variables. Figure 4 present the corresponding CDS-based networks. The figures reflect the implications of the sovereign debt crisis in the sense that some sovereigns (represented by square vertices), mostly those affected by the crisis, move towards the center of the networks. This is particularly true in the aftermath of the global financial crisis and the increase of the sovereign debt crisis (2010) (2011) (2012) . Particularly, the CDS tail risk of France, Italy and Spain becomes deeply connected with the tail risk of financial companies. Italy stands out as the most important sovereign according to this topology, but also France and Spain exhibit a high degree of interconnectedness in 2010-2012. This shape persists also in 2011-2013, where also Portugal, Ireland and Austria gain importance. The centrality of the German sovereign, on the other hand, is comparatively low, confirming Germany's role as anchor of stability as opposed to a transmitter of tail risk. Table 4 shows that the evolution of network density over time resembles that of the bank networks above until the period 2008-2010. In both cases, they peak during 2008-2010. The CDS-based networks, however, reach another high during 2011-2013, where the network density is equal to the crisis peak level. This suggests that tail dependence as measured by network density in sovereign-bank networks can serve as an indicator for the crisis intensity. While the 2010-2012 period was just as critical to the survival of European Monetary Union as the 2008-2010 period, the first was not detected as problematic by pure bank networks.
Figures 3 and
The increase of sovereigns' connectedness is particularly true for countries which have been strongly affected by the sovereign debt crisis (so-called 'crisis countries'), i.e., Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. According to Table 5 , the connectedness of 'crisis countries' and 'non-crisis countries' is relatively similar during the global financial crisis (2006) (2007) (2008) . 6 In the subsequent periods, however, we observe a clear increase of the average centrality of 'crisis countries', while others are only affected to a much smaller extend. These results indicate that a simple network statistic, as the network degree, captures substantial information about the evolution of a sovereign's contribution to systemic risk.
The share of sovereign-bank linkages, as shown by Table 6 , reveals supportive information for this view. During the global financial crisis, 'crisis countries' show, on average, a slightly lower share of sovereign-bank linkages than the others. With the advent of the European sovereign debt crisis, however, the picture strongly reverts with the share of sovereign-bank linkages of 'crisis countries' increasing, where that of the other countries remains at about the same level. Hence, it is not only the increasing interconnectedness of a sovereign, but obviously the increase of linkages to financial institutions. Italy displays a particularly high share of sovereign-bank linkages, whereas that of Germany is comparatively low. In contrast, the time evolution of financial fragmentation, as represented by the share of domestic linkages, resembles that of the bank networks analyzed in Section 4.1. Again, fragmentation peaks during 2010-2012 before receding slightly.
Systemic risk contributions
Building on the estimated banking network structure in Section 4.1, we estimate the systemic risk contribution of a bank based on (5) and (6). The choice of the underlying grouping follows two criteria: On the one hand, companies within a group should be preferably similar in terms of their average marginal systemic impact and the way how characteristics B influence this effect. In this case, the coefficients of components of the systemic risk beta (6) are captured sufficiently well by respective common parameters within the group. On the other hand, we aim at keeping the number of groups small to ensure the availability of a sufficient number of observations per group and thus the precision of the resulting beta estimate. Investigating different combinations and number of groups we found a setting as follows the most appropriate: In particular, the regressions are based on three groups, where the first group contains all banks below the overall empirical median in size and below median in leverage, the second is below median in size and above median in leverage, or vice versa and the last is above median in size and above the median in leverage. Figure 5 shows the estimated systemic risk network at the height of the European sovereign debt crisis in June 2012. It stems from the baseline specification as used in Section 4.1. While depicting the underlying network structure, we visualize the magnitude of the estimated systemic risk beta, the corresponding VaR and the resulting total effect corresponding to the product of the two and referred to as realized systemic risk. Again, the node sizes reflect the quartiles of the corresponding underlying (cross-sectional) distributions with banks being in the respective top quartile explicitly labeled.
The first two plots of Figure 5 highlight the differences between the individual and the systemic perspective. The banks that rank highly in the marginal systemic relevance distribution tend to be comparatively large and well known entities, including BBVA and Santander from Spain, or Barclays, HSBC, and Royal Bank of Scotland from the UK. The banks that rank highly in the VaR distribution, on the other hand, are mainly from crisis countries. For instance, all banks headquartered in Greece and Cyprus are in the highest quartile of the VaR distribution. At the same time, they exhibit only moderate correlations with the left tail of the riskindex. Conversely, the Swedish banks display a comparatively strong correlation with the riskindex, but are very safe individually. Table 8 ranks banks according to marginal systemic relevance and lists the associated group, as well as the bank's size, leverage and interconnectedness. Table 8 shows that the estimated systemic risk beta increases with size and leverage as captured by the grouping. The last column demonstrates that more interconnected banks likewise display a higher degree of tail dependence. Thus, size, leverage, and interconnectedness modify the estimated systemic risk beta in line with theoretical priors. More importantly, the results also suggest that traditional balance sheet characteristics alone provide an incomplete account of systemic relevance.
The third plot of Figure 5 shows the distribution of realized systemic risk, which integrates the individual and the systemic perspective. Banks in the fourth quartile of the distribution tend to rank highly in one risk metric and to exhibit an intermediate level of the other. Only three banks from what is typicially considered the euro area core were at the time present in the fourth quartile of the realized systemic risk distribution: Dexia, KBC, and Natixis. Perhaps more surprisingly, this applies to only one bank each from Italy and Spain, despite the pressure exerted by financial markets at this stage of the sovereign debt crisis. Less surprisingly, five banks from the crisis countries are present in the fourth quartile of the realized systemic risk distribution.
Robustness Checks
To validate our analysis, we conducted various robustness and sensitivity checks: First, we analyzed the sensitivity of results with respect to the choice of the riskindex R (i,t 0 ) . While the form of weighting (e.g., equally weighting instead of value-weighting) does not qualitatively change the results, its role as control variable for a consistent estimation of systemic risk betas is distinct. Actually, leaving out R (i,t 0 ) influences the estimates of systemic risk betas and consequently the resulting systemic risk ranking. Second, we checked the dependence of beta estimates on the number of underlying groups. Using, for instance, an even rougher categorization based on two groups only, has very mild effects on the final outcomes. Hence, our estimates show sufficient stability with respect to the underlying grouping. Third, we redo the analysis by including asset growth as additional control in the vector B. This extension, however, produces multi-collinearity effects inducing instable estimates. Therefore, a specification with leverage, size and net i t as the drivers of time variabilities of systemic risk betas turns out to be sufficient.
Conclusions
The paper provides a framework for estimating bank-specific time-varying systemic risk contributions and applies it to a comprehensive sample of large European banks. Our measure of realized systemic risk takes into account both the individual riskiness of the bank as well as degree of price comovement with the left tail of the financial system return distribution, which we refer to as marginal systemic relevance. Unsurprisingly, we find that at the height of the sovereign debt crisis banks from programme countries exhibit the greatest degree of fragility. We also document that marginal systemic relevance increases with size, leverage, and interconnectedness. Banks from programme countries also rank highly in the distribution of realized systemic risk.
The systemic risk contributions are based on tail dependence networks that can be used as monitoring tool and thus are an output of interest in its own right. We show that network density varies as expected with the intensity of the financial crisis. We further document that the fragmentation of the European financial system is reflected in a clustering of tail dependence relationships at the country level and provide evidence that fragmentation has peaked. Constructing the networks based on CDS spreads allow for a symmetric treatment of banks and sovereign and to explicitly represent bank-sovereign interaction. The tail dependence networks reveal a dramatic increase in the interdependence of banks and sovereigns since the beginning of the financial crisis. While there is evidence that bank-sovereign interaction has peaked it is still way above the levels observed before the crisis.
Step 2: Run an l 1 -penalized quantile regression and calculate for each (λ i,t 0 (c); w i,t 0 (γ)) on the pairwise grid (c, γ) of step 1,
with the set of potentially relevant regressors
2 and the loss function ρ q (u) = u(q − I(u < 0)), where the indicator I(·) is 1 for u < 0 and zero otherwise.
Step 3: Drop all firms in R with absolute marginal effects | α i,t 0 (c, γ)| below a threshold a = 0.0001 keeping only the K(i, t 0 ) remaining relevant regressors R (i,t 0 ) (c, γ). Re-estimate the unrestricted model (9) without penalty only with the selected relevant regressors R (i,t 0 ) (c, γ). This regression yields the post-LASSO estimates α i,t 0 q (c, γ). The final estimates are the ones which maximize the in-sample predictive ability of the resulting VaR specification jointly in c and γ. This is evaluated according to a backtest criterion (see Berkowitz, Christoffersen, and Pelletier (2011) ). The table presents the share of domestic linkages between banks of a given country. In the case of AT, DK, FI, HU, NL, and PL, there is just one bank in the sample so the quantity is not defined. The column titled crisis refers to the simple average for a group of countries composed of CY, ES, GR, IE, IT, and PT. Non-crisis countries refers to the average over all other countries in the sample. 
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